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ENDREW F. CLAIRVOYANCE 
Mark C. Weber* 
ABSTRACT 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has declared that “Prior 
decisions of this Court are consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Endrew F.,” the 2017 Supreme Court case interpreting the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act obligation to furnish 
students with disabilities free, appropriate public education.  This 
Essay considers whether that statement is accurate, and concludes that 
while some of the past Second Circuit decisions fit comfortably with 
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1, 
others do not.  The Essay submits that the court of appeals should 
confess a lack of clairvoyance in its earlier decisions and forthrightly 
overrule or limit those cases that are not consistent with the 
interpretation of the appropriate education duty found in Endrew F. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ambrose Bierce defined a clairvoyant as someone “who has 
the power of seeing that which is invisible to her patron, namely, that 
1
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he is a blockhead.”1  In the wake of Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. 
Douglas County School District RE-1,2 the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals declared that its previous caselaw anticipated the legal 
development that the Endrew F. decision represented, and thus its 
earlier decisions continue to be reliable guides to the meaning of free, 
appropriate public education.3  Whether those earlier cases actually are 
consistent with Endrew F.’s approach is the question this Essay tries 
to address.  Was the Second Circuit clairvoyant in foreseeing Endrew 
F.’s interpretation of the appropriate education obligation, or should 
litigants and observers fear they are being taken for blockheads? 
The answer is mixed.  A number of Second Circuit cases, 
including recent and prominent ones, employ language about 
appropriate education that is similar to what the Supreme Court 
rejected in Endrew F. and reach outcomes that could well come out 
differently under Endrew F.’s interpretation of the law.4  Nevertheless, 
other cases of the court of appeals appear to interpret appropriate 
education consistently with Endrew F. or at least to reach conclusions 
on the facts of the cases that Endrew F. would support.5  This Essay 
suggests that the court of appeals and district courts in the Second 
Circuit should acknowledge the inconsistency of those former cases 
with Endrew F. and overrule them or restrict their application.  At the 
very least, the court of appeals should not make a blanket assertion that 
the cases are all reliable precedent.  
The list of cases applying Endrew F. is still fairly modest, and 
the commentary on the case remains of manageable scope.6  Only a 
few sources have begun to collect and analyze the case’s sequels.7  This 
 
* Vincent de Paul Professor, DePaul University College of Law.  
1 AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 16-17 (Dover Publ’ns. 1993) (1911). 
2 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
3 Mr. P v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
322 (2018). 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 41-53. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 54-59. 
6 See, e.g., Endrew F. and Fry Symposium, The Special Education Cases of 2017, 46 J.L. 
& EDUC. 425 (2017).  Some commentary focuses on specific aspects of appropriate education 
or specific educational settings.  See, e.g., Maliha Ikram, When Local Governments Waiver: 
Giving Bite to Students With Disabilities’ Federal Right to Avail Physical Education, 15 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 345, 358-63 (2018); David Dante Troutt, Trapped in Tragedies: 
Childhood Trauma, Spatial Inequality, and Law, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 601, 639-42 (2018); 
Michael A. Naclerio, Note, Accountability Through Procedure? Rethinking Charter School 
Accountability and Special Education Rights, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1166-69 (2017). 
7 See, e.g., Maureen A. MacFarlane, In Search of the Meaning of an “Appropriate 
Education”: Ponderings on the Fry and Endrew Decisions, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 539, 548 & n.56, 
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Essay seeks to add to the literature by critiquing the effort of the 
Second Circuit in Mr. P to harmonize previous caselaw with Endrew 
F.  
Part I of this Essay describes Endrew F. and its impact on 
existing caselaw regarding the duty to provide appropriate education.  
Part II discusses Mr. P v. West Hartford Board of Education, the 
Second Circuit case that declares that prior circuit precedent is 
consistent with Endrew F., and considers its basis for drawing that 
conclusion.  Part III lists and discusses a number of Second Circuit 
cases that embody approaches at odds with Endrew F., as well as a few 
that might accurately be said to anticipate the Supreme Court decision.  
It argues that the Second Circuit should evaluate its prior cases 
carefully and individually, and overrule, limit, or, if justified, reaffirm 
them in light of Endrew F., rather than issuing a blanket statement of 
approval. 
I. ENDREW F. 
In Endrew F., the parents of Drew, a child with autism, argued 
that the program he was offered did not satisfy the school district’s 
obligation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(hereinafter “IDEA”)8 to provide free, appropriate public education.9  
Drew had significant behavioral problems when he was in school.  He 
screamed, he climbed over furniture and other students, he displayed 
irrational fears, and he occasionally ran from the classroom.10  Drew’s 
 
553-57 (2017); see also Patricia E. Kefalas Dudek, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School 
District RE-1, 14 NAELA J. 73 (2018) (discussing three court of appeals cases).  Professor 
Zirkel has studied outcomes of a total of 49 court cases with substantive appropriate education 
holdings in which administrative decision makers relied on pre-Endrew F. caselaw and the 
court addressed the issue applying Endrew F.  He found that the administrative outcome was 
unchanged in 90% of the court decisions, though he noted that 7 of the 44 outcomes that did 
not change were in favor of the parent.  Perry A. Zirkel, The Aftermath of Endrew F. One Year 
Later: An Updated Outcomes Analysis, 352 EDUC. L. REP. 448, 450 (2018).  Endrew F. may 
currently be having a significant impact at the administrative level.  In Illinois in the post-
Endrew F. period, the fraction of due process cases decided in favor of parents on at least one 
significant issue appears quite high, see Due Process Decisions, ILL. ST. BOARD EDUC., 
https://sec1.isbe.net/sedsinquiry/dueprocessdecisions.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2018), 
compared to the historical rate of about 20-40% in various states that were surveyed in the 
years before Endrew F., see Mark C. Weber, In Defense of IDEA Due Process, 29 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 495, 509-10 (2014) (collecting studies). 
8 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016). 
9 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 997 (2017). 
10 Id. at 996. 
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parents felt that his educational progress had plateaued, and the school 
reinforced that impression by offering a fifth grade individualized 
educational program (hereinafter “IEP”) for him that carried over 
objectives and goals from previous years.11  The parents contested the 
program in an administrative due process hearing and unilaterally 
placed Drew at a private program.  The private school, Firefly Autism 
House, developed a behavioral intervention plan for Drew and wrote 
more demanding academic goals for him.  Within months, his behavior 
improved and he made academic progress he had not achieved 
before.12  The public school proposed another revised program, which 
the parents again contested.  In the culmination of the proceedings, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the public school’s program 
offered Drew a free, appropriate public education.13  The court 
evaluated the program under the standard that “the educational benefit 
mandated by IDEA must merely be ‘more than de minimis.’”14 
The Supreme Court responded by vacating and remanding.  
The unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that the 
Court’s previous decision on the meaning of appropriate education, 
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. 
Rowley,15 did not produce a single test for the adequacy of educational 
programs under the IDEA.  Rather, it embodied “a general approach: 
To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer 
an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress 
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”16  The Court said 
Rowley established that for a child who is fully integrated in the regular 
classroom, an IEP typically should permit the student to achieve 
passing marks and advance from grade to grade, although not every 
child who advances from grade to grade necessarily receives 
appropriate education in satisfaction of the law.17  But whether a child 
is fully integrated or not, each student must be offered an educational 
program that is “appropriately ambitious in light of [the child’s] 
circumstances . . . . [E]very child should have the chance to meet 
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 996-97. 
13 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 
2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
14 Id. at 1338 (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th 
Cir. 2008)). 
15 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
16 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. 
17 Id. at 1000 & n.2. 
4
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challenging objectives.”18  The Court declared that this standard for 
appropriate education is “markedly more demanding than the ‘merely 
more than de minimis’ test applied by the Tenth Circuit.”19  After 
further litigation, the case returned to the district court, which decided 
in favor of the parents.20  Press reports indicate that the case settled on 
appeal.21 
Endrew F. did not overrule Rowley, so it kept current Supreme 
Court caselaw intact.  But Rowley is the only previous Supreme Court 
case to consider the content of appropriate education, so there was not 
much to disturb.  With regard to lower court decisions, Endrew F. 
made clear that an interpretation of Rowley, and of appropriate 
education, that imposes only minimal obligations is wrong.  Language 
like “merely more than de minimis benefit” is no longer an accurate 
description of the appropriate education standard.  Instead, at the least, 
the program has to be appropriately ambitious and feature challenging 
objectives, a markedly more demanding standard. 
II. ENDREW F. MEETS MR. P  
Mr. P v. West Hartford Board of Education involved a high 
school student with high functioning autism spectrum disorder-
Asperger’s Syndrome, nonverbal learning disabilities, and psychotic 
disorder.22  The student, who previously had done well in school, was 
receiving grades of D in all his classes in the December of his 
sophomore year.23  A brief hospitalization revealed that he manifested 
suicidal and homicidal thoughts, which led to his diagnosis.24  The 
 
18 Id. at 1000. 
19 Id.  The Court went on to reaffirm Rowley’s rejection of the claim that all children must 
be offered an opportunity to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and make 
societal contributions substantially equal to the opportunity afforded children without 
disabilities.  The Court stressed the importance of deferring to the expertise and judgment of 
school authorities, but further declared that “a reviewing court may fairly expect those 
authorities to be able to offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their decisions that 
shows the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to make progress appropriate in 
light of his circumstances.”  Id. at 1001-02. 
20 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE 1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (D. 
Colo. 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-1089, 2018 WL 4360885 (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 2018). 
21 E.g., Anne Schimke, Douglas County District Pays $1.3 Million to Settle Landmark 
Special Education Case, DENVER POST (June 20, 2018, 6:25 PM), https://www.denverpost.co 
m/2018/06/20/douglas-county-district-special-education-case/. 
22 885 F.3d 735 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 322 (2018). 
23 Id. at 742. 
24 Id. at 740. 
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school did not initiate a special education evaluation under the IDEA, 
but in January approved accommodations, including counseling, 
pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.25  The student 
stopped attending school in February and received tutoring at home.26  
His parents requested special education for him in March and he was 
hospitalized again in April.27  After an evaluation, the school district 
found him eligible in June and developed a special education program 
for his junior and senior years.28  The school placed him in an 
alternative high school program called STRIVE, which featured data-
driven behavior management in addition to coursework geared to the 
school’s graduation requirements.29  His grades in the program were 
generally good, though he had attendance problems and one physical 
altercation with a classmate.30  He graduated on time, but a dispute 
developed over post-secondary services and the parents eventually 
contested the school’s treatment of the student from the beginning of 
sophomore year through the school’s rejection of the post-secondary 
services requested by the parents.31  The parents sought compensatory 
education and prospective relief.  The school prevailed on all but a 
minor issue at the administrative and district court levels,32 and the 
court of appeals affirmed.  
There was a significant dispute in the case regarding the timing 
and adequacy of the student’s evaluation for special education 
eligibility.  But as relevant to this Essay, the key issue was the 
substantive adequacy of the programs the public school offered the 
student.  The court of appeals agreed that the programs provided 
appropriate education, stressing that the alternative high school 
program enabled the student to pass from junior to senior year and 
achieve As and Bs, which permitted him to meet graduation 
requirements and make progress as to his behavior.33  The homebound 
tutoring was not adequate at first, but the school offered compensatory 
tutoring hours during the summer.34  Though the parents argued that 
 
25 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). 
26 Mr. P, 885 F.3d at 743. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 740. 
29 Id. at 744. 
30 Id. at 745. 
31 Id. at 746-47. 
32 The issue concerned transportation to the post-secondary program.  Id. at 747. 
33 Id. at 757-58. 
34 Id. 
6
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their proposed post-secondary program was superior to that of the 
school district, the court said that was not the relevant question and 
that with a modification as to transportation the school’s program was 
sufficient to provide appropriate education.35 
The court of appeals stated that “[p]rior decisions of this Court 
are consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F.”36 
relying solely on the 1998 decision Walczak v. Florida Union Free 
School District, which declared, “Plainly, . . . the door of public 
education must be opened for a disabled child in a ‘meaningful’ way.  
This is not done if an IEP affords the opportunity for only ‘trivial 
advancement.’”37  In a note, the court distinguished Cerra v. Pauling 
Central School District, which contains language very similar to that 
of the Tenth Circuit opinion the Endrew F. Court vacated: “a school 
district fulfills its substantive obligations under the IDEA if it provides 
an IEP that is ‘likely to produce progress, not regression,’ and if the 
IEP affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere ‘trivial 
advancement.’”38  Mr. P noted that the state review decision that the 
case upheld said that the student had made meaningful progress.39  
“Thus, Cerra should not be read or cited for the proposition that 
anything more than ‘mere trivial advancement’ is sufficient to satisfy 
the IDEA.”40  
Of course, it is possible to dispute whether the court of appeals 
faithfully followed the Supreme Court’s Endrew F. in Mr. P.  The 
district court in that case had used a standard of likely “progress, not 
regression,” and “an opportunity greater than mere trivial 
advancement,” mirroring the language of the vacated Tenth Circuit 
decision in Endrew F.  The court of appeals in Mr. P did not go into 
depth about whether the goals set for the student plaintiff were 
“challenging objectives,” but relied instead on the fact that he had a 
good grade point average, was promoted from tenth to eleventh grade, 
and managed to graduate on time.  The court never asked whether the 
program was “appropriately ambitious,” nor did it discuss whether the 
IEP satisfied a standard “markedly more demanding than the ‘merely 
de minimis’ test.”  The word “ambitious” appears nowhere in the 
 
35 Id. at 759-60. 
36 Id. at 757.  
37 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
38 427 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130). 
39 Mr. P, 885 F.3d at 757 n.12.  
40 Id.   
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opinion.  But the fact remains that the student did do well under the 
school’s program by a number of measures. 
III. PRESCIENT OR OBSTINANT? 
Of greater importance for future cases, however, is the court’s 
assertion that not only Mr. P but also Walczak and the whole catalogue 
of older Second Circuit decisions anticipated Endrew F.’s view of 
appropriate education.  Here skepticism is in order.  Walczak 
overturned a ruling by Judge Brieant that had rejected the school 
district’s placement of a child in a “developmentally disabled” 
intermediate program that was the continuation of the program from 
which she was aging out.41  Judge Brieant agreed with the parent that 
the program was not adequate to provide appropriate education, and 
found the parent’s unilateral placement of the child at a private, 
residential school justified.  Reversing, the court of appeals 
emphasized the learning the child had achieved in the public program.  
The court noted, but did not put any emphasis on, the social 
advancement that the child made in a year at the private placement: 
“B.W. began to establish friendships with other children and to 
participate in group activities.  Dr. Liss reported that B.W.’s ‘living 
skills’ had also improved from the level of a five-year old to those of 
a nine-year old.”42  The huge improvement in appropriate behavior that 
the child made looks very similar to that made by Drew when his 
parents put him in a specialized private placement.  It is an open 
question whether the goals set for the child in Walczak were 
“appropriately ambitious” and whether she would continue to make 
progress such that her program in the public school would be 
“markedly more demanding” than one that would provide for more 
than merely trivial advancement.  The court of appeals resolved doubts 
about whether the education was appropriate by deferring to the 
administrative decision makers, but there was no discussion of what 
standards they applied, and of course neither they nor the court had any 
reason to anticipate Endrew F.’s reading of the law. 
A sampling of other Second Circuit decisions reveals several 
whose consistency with Endrew F. is questionable.  Consider, for 
example, T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free School District, which took 
 
41 Walczak, 142 F.3d at 121. 
42 Id. at 128. 
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the “an opportunity greater than mere trivial advancement” standard 
from Cerra and overturned a district court determination that the 
program proposed for the child was inadequate for failure to provide 
in-home Applied Behavioral Analysis as the child made the transition 
into kindergarten.43  The court noted that the program offered ten hours 
of in-school Applied Behavioral Analysis (down from 30-35 hours that 
the child previously received), and the court relied, perhaps 
implausibly, on an administrative finding that the child’s biting and 
off-topic recitation of language picked up from television shows did 
not interfere with his learning.44  Although the child’s biting behavior 
eventually ceased, it is an open question whether that was enough of 
an appropriately ambitious goal. 
In A.C. v. Board of Education of the Chappaqua Central 
School District, the Second Circuit also relied on Cerra’s language 
about greater than merely trivial advancement and reversed the holding 
of the district court that the child’s program was insufficient.45  There 
was a significant dispute over whether and to what extent the child was 
making progress in the public school program.  The impartial hearing 
officer and the district court took one position but the state review 
officer, and ultimately the court of appeals, took the other.46  No 
adjudicator was tasked with asking if the progress was markedly more 
demanding than what a “merely more than de minimis” standard would 
require, and the quotation of Cerra’s language parallel to the Tenth 
Circuit language in Endrew F. casts doubt whether the program met 
Endrew F.’s standard for appropriate education. 
Grim v. Rhinebeck Central School District upheld a public 
school IEP that did not guarantee the provision of Orton-Gillingham 
reading instruction, which the trial court had said was the only method 
supported by the record for educating the dyslexic child who was the 
subject of the suit.47  Citing Walczak, the Second Circuit said the sole 
question on the substantive appropriateness of the IEP was whether the 
child was “likely to make progress or regress under the proposed 
plan.”48  Both on the facts and on the language, the case is closer to the 
 
43 554 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009). 
44 Id. at 254. 
45 553 F.3d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 2009). 
46 Id. 
47 346 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 2003). 
48 Id. at 383 (quoting Walczak v. Fla. Union Free. Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (1998)). 
9
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court of appeals decision in Endrew F. than that of the Supreme 
Court.49 
Reaching back to the period before the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act was retitled the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, the prominent case50 Karl ex rel. Karl v. 
Board of Education of the Geneseo Central School District overturned 
a district court order that a student with intellectual disability be 
offered a more favorable teacher-student ratio in a vocational 
program.51  The court simply asked whether the student’s program as 
a whole was reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit,52 
without any consideration of whether it was appropriately ambitious in 
light of the student’s circumstances or whether its goals were 
challenging.  The dissent felt that the vocational program did not meet 
even the educational-benefit standard in light of the teacher-student 
ratio that was offered.53  The standard the court applied, being drawn 
 
49 Some Second Circuit cases that principally involve issues other than appropriate 
education also contain language regarding appropriate education dubiously compatible with 
Endrew F.  See M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 143 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(“[T]he ‘IEP must provide the opportunity for more than only “trivial advancement.”’” 
(quoting P. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 
2008))). 
50 Karl was cited as recently as March 17, 2017, five days before Endrew F. came down.  
J.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 242 F. Supp. 3d 186, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). 
51 736 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1984). 
52 Id. at 877-78.  
53 Id. at 878 (Pratt, J., dissenting).  Nonprecedential Second Circuit cases (even one decided 
after Endrew F.) and cases from district courts within the Second Circuit are also doubtfully 
consistent with the Supreme Court decision, in light of the similarity between the Tenth 
Circuit’s standard of “merely more than de minimis” and the Second Circuit cases’ variations 
on more than only trivial progress.  The cases are not necessarily wrongly decided on their 
facts, but should be examined carefully for consistency with Endrew F. if a court is 
contemplating relying on them.  See, e.g., R.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 689 F. App’x 48, 51 
(2d Cir. 2017) (interpreting Endrew F. to mean that “the IEP need not bring the child to grade-
level achievement, but it must aspire to provide more than de minimis educational progress”); 
D.A.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 630 F. App’x 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying standard of 
“likely to produce progress and not regression”); F.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Great Neck 
U.F.S.D., 274 F. Supp. 3d 94, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Therefore, a school district satisfies its 
obligations arising under the IDEA ‘if it provides an IEP that is likely to produce progress, not 
regression, and if the IEP affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere trivial 
advancement.’” (quoting M.P.G. ex rel. J.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08 Civ. 8051, 2010 
WL 3398256, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010)), aff’d, 735 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2018); A.G. 
v. Bd. of Educ. of the Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 16 CV 1530, 2017 WL 1200906, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (stating that in district program student “did make progress both in 
decoding and in reading during the 2013-2014 school year and that his progress was not 
trivial”); Y.D. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 14 CV 1137-LTS, 2017 WL 1051129, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2017) (finding that IEP met standard of “likely to produce progress, not 
regression,” and must afford the student “an opportunity greater than mere trivial 
10
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from Rowley, was not rendered unsound by Endrew F., which 
reaffirmed Rowley as precedent.  Nevertheless, Endrew F. added a 
gloss to the language that affects application of the Rowley standard 
going forward and does not match the approach used in Karl. 
All this is not to deny that some Second Circuit cases 
effectively anticipated Endrew F.’s approach or otherwise may be 
correct on their facts under Endrew F.  For example, A.M. v. New York 
City Department of Education applied a standard of whether the 
department’s proposed program was reasonably calculated to confer 
educational benefits, and determined that a lack of one-on-one Applied 
Behavioral Analysis therapy rendered it substantively inadequate.54  
Similarly, in R.E. v. New York City Department of Education, the court 
applied the unelaborated “reasonably calculated to create educational 
benefit” standard and found a denial of appropriate education in one of 
the three cases before it and no denial in two others, stressing in each 
case the evidence about the individual needs of the children.55  In M.H. 
v. New York City Department of Education, the court referenced the 
educational-benefit standard and other language from Rowley, and 
found that one of the two children in the cases before the court was not 
offered appropriate education for failure to offer the child intensive 
one-on-one instruction.56  The court rejected the claim concerning the 
other child largely on the basis of witness credibility.57  In contrast to 
these cases decided in favor of the parents’ position, T.Y. v. New York 
City Department of Education ruled against the parents’ claim.58  
Nevertheless, it appears consistent with Endrew F. in that it relied on 
the fact that the public school’s offer of a one-on-one aide provided 
 
advancement”), appeal dismissed, No. 17-1150 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2017); D.B. v. Ithaca City 
Sch. Dist., No. 5:14-CV-01520, 2016 WL 4768824 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2016) (applying 
standard of opportunity for greater than mere trivial advancement), aff’d, 690 F. App’x 778 
(2d Cir. 2017). 
54 845 F.3d 523, 541 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Reyes ex rel. R.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 
760 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that proposed program with only temporary provision of 
one-on-one services failed to offer appropriate education, applying standard of whether 
program was likely to provide progress, not regression). 
55 694 F.3d 167, 194 (2d Cir. 2012). 
56 685 F.3d 217, 242, 252 (2d Cir. 2012).  
57 See id. at 258.  Another example of a case foreshadowing Endrew F., Mrs. B. ex rel. M.M. 
v. Milford Board of Education, 103 F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1997), rejected the school district’s 
proposed program for a child with a learning disability and other conditions, and endorsed the 
parent’s unilateral residential placement of a child; departing from a standard of trivial 
advancement, the court emphasized that the private placement was needed for the child to 
make “meaningful progress.”  Id. at 1121. 
58 584 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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“significant benefits” to the child with regard to behaviors that 
interfered with his learning.59 
* * * 
Both intellectual honesty and the duty of providing accurate 
guidance to lower courts require a court of appeals to review its 
previous cases carefully when the Supreme Court adopts an 
interpretation that is at odds with the interpretations the court applied 
in the past.  Mr. P’s discussion of Cerra, though it did not overrule the 
case, at least earned Cerra a yellow flag on Westlaw.  Judges and 
litigants are entitled to the warning that other Second Circuit cases are 
not necessarily consistent with Endrew F.  They should not be given 
an unconsidered assurance that existing precedent remains intact.  In 
contrast to the Second Circuit’s decision in Mr. P, the Fourth Circuit 
acknowledged the likelihood of conflicts between extant circuit 
caselaw and the Supreme Court decision in Endrew F.60  That step put 
litigants and judges on notice of the danger of relying on pre-Endrew 
F. cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The temptation to validate one’s past work as times change is 
perfectly natural, whether one is a scholar, an artist, or a judge.  But a 
hasty reaffirmance of what has gone before provides poor counsel to 
those who must render decisions in the future.  The development of the 
law that occurred in Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County 
School District RE-1 demands careful and individual consideration of 
existing precedent concerning the duty to provide appropriate 
education.  The opinion writers of the past were not clairvoyants.  They 
 
59 Id. at 419.  
60 See M.L. ex rel. Leiman v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Our prior FAPE 
standard is similar to that of the Tenth Circuit, which was overturned by Endrew F.”), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 752 (2018).  But see E.F. ex rel. Fulsang v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. 
Dist., 726 F. App’x 535, 537 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that Ninth Circuit’s previous appropriate 
education “standard comports with Endrew’s clarification of Rowley”); C.G. ex rel. Keith G. 
v. Waller Indep. Sch. Dist., 697 F. App’x 816, 819 (5th Cir. 2017) (declaring that Cypress-
Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997), is consistent with 
Endrew F.’s interpretation of appropriate education).  The Ninth Circuit’s position is alarming, 
not the least because prior circuit caselaw on appropriate education is internally contradictory.  
Compare N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating 
that Rowley standard has been effectively superseded by heightened “meaningful benefit” 
standard), with J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding 
Rowley standard not superseded and proper standard to be that of “educational benefit”). 
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were judges working in good faith but in the absence of all but a single 
Supreme Court opinion that considered a single set of facts half a 
lifetime ago. 
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